

11 G 12

AN
E S S A Y
ON THE
I M M O R T A L I T Y
OF THE
S O U L.

Y A S S E
ENT TO
I M O R T A L I T Y
OF THE
S O U L

Dedicated to The QUEEN.

AN
E S S A Y 698. f 6
5-8
ON THE
I M M O R T A L I T Y
OF THE
S O U L;

SHEWING

The Fallacy and Malignity of a *Sceptical* one,
lately published, together with *such* another on
S U I C I D E; and both ascribed, by the Editor, to

THE L A T E
D A V I D H U M E, Esq.

Printed for the AUTHOR,

By T. SPILSBURY, *Snow-Hill, London.*

1784.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

THE SECRETARY

OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

The following is a list of the names of the officers of the Army who have been promoted to the rank of Major-General since the 1st of January, 1880.

THE ARMY

DAVID H. DAVIS

THOMAS H. BAKER

JOHN H. BAKER

TO THE
QUEEN'S
 Most Excellent MAJESTY.

MADAM!

Nothing but the infinite
 importance of the Sacred
 Doctrine, which the Author
 of this little Essay endeavours
 to

to defend against a late infidious attack, can afford him an excuse for laying it at YOUR MAJESTY'S Feet.

May God! in his infinite mercy, suffer this Nation to be long, very long blessed, in YOUR MAJESTY'S Sacred Person, with a Patroness, and an Example of all that can render Virtue and Religion amiable. And

May YOUR MAJESTY be most graciously pleased to admit,

mit, among all the tributes paid
to your eminent and endear-
ing Virtues, this very small,
but very genuine one, from,

M A D A M!

One of the KING's
most loyal,
most dutiful,
and most humble
Subjects,

The Author.

his among all the virtues said
to your emperor, and under-
ing Virtues, this very small,
but very genuine one, from

M A D A M!

One of the King's

most loyal

most dutiful

and most humble

Subject

The Nobles

P R E F A C E.

THough the Author of this little Effay is resolved to leave the vindication of it against all fallacious, and invidious attacks, to pens more fertile, and less incumbered than his own; and to submit silently to the criticisms of all candid and impartial Reviewers; yet he thinks himself obliged to anticipate his Answers to some Queries which he may be exposed to, and one of which he apprehends to be this:

b

Why

Why he seems to have taken it for granted, that the late celebrated Mr. Hume has been the Author of the *Essays on Suicide*, and the *Immortality of the Soul*, published so long after his death, and only ascribed to him by the Editor, without any positive proof?

To this he answers,

That the Editor, in *his* Preface, asserts, that they are generally attributed to Mr. Hume; and corroborates his assertion by circumstances, which, together with the style and manner in which *those Essays* are written, convince the Author of *this*, that he is warranted to consider
Mr.

Mr. Hume as the Author of them, as long as it is not publicly, and warrantably denied, by such of his Friends, or Relations, as may imagine his memory to be injured by it.

Another Query may be,

Why he has contented himself with exposing the fallacy and malignity of the Second of those Essays, without taking any notice of the First, nor of the two letters from Rousseau's *Eloïsa*, on Suicide?

To this he shall only say, that, though Mr. Hume, or the Editor of his Essays, has thought proper to bestow on his Essay on Suicide, the

honour of precedence in their publication ; the Author of this Essay has considered the other, on the Soul's Immortality, as much more deserving of it ; since, without the support and assistance of the poison it conveys, that which issues from the Essay on Suicide must lose a great deal of its power and effect ; as well as that which is so artfully interwoven and disguised in the letters extracted from Rousseau's *Eloïsa*.

A more material Query, he apprehends, may be *this*:

Why he has thought it necessary to undertake a refutation of the Second Essay, whilst the same volume in which both are published, contains

contains also the Editor's very learned and elaborate Remarks on the one, as well as on the other, by way of antidote against the poison they convey?

This requires the following answer, which he hopes will prove satisfactory.

The Editor's antidotal Remarks have appeared to the Author of this little Essay, too abstruse, and too prolix, for the generality of Readers; and not at all a plain, concise, and perspicuous refutation of Mr. Hume's sophistry. In other respects, he allows them to have great merit: but, tho' they should even prove to be as plain and perspicuous as they have appeared

appeared to him to be the reverse, (perhaps from a deficiency in the eyes of his own understanding) he thinks it, nevertheless, one of his social and religious duties, to throw his mite into the Editor's antidotal scale.

The Poison is of such a refined, insinuating, and dangerous nature; and so easily, and generally procured, and administered; that every well-wisher to the Community, who has the least knack at this sort of Chymistry, ought to exert his skill in the composition and distribution of Antidotes of this kind, on such an inviting and urgent occasion: especially when we consider how much the present reigning taste for dissipation

tion

tion and profligacy 'favours the various and numerous Poisoners of the mind, in the administration of their alluring and fatal Nostrums.

The Author of this little Essay, very philanthropically, but he fears, very vainly, wishes, that some much abler Chymist of this kind than himself, could once compose and exhibit such an attractive, and palatable preservative against all infection of the mind, as might be greedily purchased and swallowed, by every individual of the human race, who should have opportunities and means, as well as occasion for the use of it.

tion and prodigal favour, the
 ous and numerous followers of the
 mind, in the administration of the
 alluring and fatal temptation.

The Author of this little Essay
 very philanthropically, but he feels
 very vainly, with, that some much
 ablest Champions of this kind than
 himself, could once compose and
 exhibit such an attractive, and palpa-
 ble picture against all infection
 of the mind, as might be greatly
 purchased and swallowed, by every
 individual of the human race, who
 should have opportunities and means,
 as well as occasion for the use of it.

E S S A Y
ON THE
IMMORTALITY of the SOUL;

In Refutation of one ascribed to

The late Celebrated Mr. *HUME*.

MR. *HUME* divides his Essay on the Immortality of the Soul, into Metaphysical, Moral, and Physical arguments, by which he very fallaciously, and very vainly,
B endeavours

endeavours to prove, on the ground of natural philosophy, not the Immortality, but the MORTALITY of the Soul. It is on the same ground, of mere natural philosophy, that I shall undertake to prove the reverse.

I shall not tire my Readers with a refutation of every one of his arguments. The whole string of them must appear to every person who has the least tincture of logic, to be no more than a concatenation of sophisms, in support of scepticism. The three or four last of his physical arguments will afford me sufficient ground for shewing the fallacy of the sophistry, from whence he draws his conclusive inference, which is in substance

stance, though differently and obliquely expressed, *that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is disproved by natural philosophy; and that, therefore, it requires an implicit faith in Divine Revelation, as a doctrine which not only surpasses, but contradicts our comprehension, full as much as if we were to believe that Existence and Non-existence are synonymous terms.*

I intend to shew, not only the fallacy, but the malignity, (I hope, no intentional one) of Mr. Hume's performance.

To do *this*, I am very glad to find that I need not give myself the trouble of discussing and controverting

any other of Mr. Hume's sophistical arguments, than those very few of his physical ones, which lead him *so exultingly* to his conclusion, as if they were truly decisive of the controversy.

To facilitate to my readers, as well as to myself, the scrutiny of them, in the course of my refutation, the following is a literal transcript of them; and also of the inference he draws from them, and with which he concludes his performance: "*Were our horrors of annihilation an original passion, not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would rather prove the mortality of the soul: for, as nature does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror a-*
gainst"

" gainst an impossible event. She may
 " give us a horror against an una-
 " voidable event, provided our endea-
 " vours, as in the present case, may
 " often remove it to some distance.
 " Death is in the end unavoidable;
 " yet the human species could not be
 " preserved, had not nature inspired
 " us with an aversion towards it. All
 " doctrines are to be suspected, which
 " are favoured by the passions; and
 " the hopes and fears which gave rise
 " to this doctrine,* are very obvious.

" 'Tis an infinite advantage, in eve-
 " ry controversy, to defend the nega-
 " tive. If the question be out of the
 " common

* He means the doctrine of the Immortality
 of the Soul, which he ought to have expressed.

" common experienced course of na-
 " ture, this circumstance is almost, if
 " not altogether decisive. By what
 " arguments or analogies can we prove
 " any state of existence, which no one
 " ever saw, and which no way resem-
 " bles any that ever was seen? Who
 " will repose such trust in any pre-
 " tended philosophy, as to admit, up-
 " on its testimony, the reality of so
 " marvellous a scene? Some new
 " species of logic is requisite for that
 " purpose, and some new faculties of
 " the mind, that may enable us to
 " comprehend that logic.

" Nothing could set in a fuller light
 " the infinite obligations which man-
 " kind have to Divine Revelation,
 " since

*“ since we find that no other medium
 “ could ascertain this great and im-
 “ portant truth.”*

Without deviating in the least from that infinite obligation, which I confess (and probably with more sincerity than Mr. Hume) to have in common with all mankind to the Divine Revelation, I shall not only undertake to disprove his pretended Philosophical Demonstration, *of there being no other medium than Divine Revelation, to ascertain the immortality of the soul*; But I shall undertake to prove to the contrary, (as it has been done in different shapes, and even in the remotest ages, by mere natural philosophers, before any christian

christian ones existed) *that this great and important truth is ascertained by mere natural philosophy*: But before I enter upon this important task, I shall revert to that malignity in Mr. Hume's performance, which I have had already in contemplation, and promised to expose,

If our abhorrence of annihilation was an original passion, (as Mr. Hume insinuates it possible to be) and consequently common to us all; and that Mr. Hume, or any other man, had found means to convince all those of the human race, who either are not blessed with the light of the Gospel, or have no *implicit* faith in Revelation, that they are to be annihilated

nihilated by death, he would have had the diabolical art, of making his own species, the most miserable of all beings on the face of our globe, wherever his doctrine should happen to be promulgated and adopted.

The truth of this assertion could be illustrated many ways. I shall confine myself to a comparative one; which is, The miserable condition in which the numerous crew of a very large ship, would find themselves, if at any period of their voyage, they were made *conscious* that their fate would be *this*, That it should be put out of their power, by an Invisible Agent, to alter their course; and that, at the end of it,

C

every

every one of them should perish in the harbour they were bound to; except a very trifling number amongst them, who should have acquired the extraordinary art of diving and swimming under water, to reach the shore. With what courage and glee the rest, and consequently the generality of them, would work the ship; and with what stomachs they would sit down to their mess, can easily be imagined.

Very happily for mankind, such an original passion does not exist, nor our annihilation; which, since nature does nothing in vain, (as
Mr.

Mr. Hume himself allows) would be necessarily the object of it.

The truth is, that our abhorrence of annihilation is no more than a derivative passion : it draws its origin, together with its imaginary object, from that truly original and general one, **OUR LOVE FOR HAPPINESS.** And since Mr. Hume allows, that Nature (*a divine or religious man would say the Author of it*) does nothing in vain, it follows, that true happiness (for I hope that Mr. Hume would also allow, that Nature (or its Author) did not intend it to be a delusive and fleeting object, no more than an ideal one) must be obtainable by some means,

and at some period, or other ; and since we find that it is not to be obtained in our present state of existence, it follows, also, that there must be a future one.

I am well convinced, that this, and every other argument of mine, must be similar to some of those which have been so often and so convincingly employed, in this important controversy, by many ancient and modern authors, eminently superior to myself : But since Mr. Hume has endeavoured to obliterate such arguments in the memory of his readers, by his fascinating sophistry ; it is necessary for me to employ those which occur to my
own

own mind, in order to destroy the charm, by the help of which he administers his poison.

I shall now proceed to expose the fallacy and malignity of his next sophistical argument, and of those with which he so *exultingly* imagines to crown the whole of his labour.

If Nature (as Mr. Hume is here pleased to say) had given us a horror against death, she would not only have done something *ultimately* in vain, but something *wantonly* cruel ; and consequently still more unworthy of her. She would have joined to our love for happiness, a
 horror

horror against an event, not only unavoidable, but which, by our endeavours to remove it at a distance, we should be obliged to have frequently in contemplation; and to which, after all our cares to avoid, and retard it, we should at last be forced to submit, with all the painful sensations and struggles of such a horror.

If this were true, she would have given us, instead of one, two original passions; of which the one would prove at last to have been a delusive, and the other a horrible, painful one; by which she would have made us doubly unhappy: unless some such other ingenious sceptic as the late celebrated

celebrated Mr. Hume, could make us believe, that a fictitious object of love, and a real one of horror, are necessary ingredients in the composition of happiness.

I must here beg leave to observe, by way of illustration, how unnaturally cruel *that* mother would be, who, by some magical art and malice, should inspire one of her daughters with an insuperable desire of remaining single ; and with a consciousness of this being her only means to be happy ; and, moreover, with a horror against a man, to whom she should already have promised her ; and given the power to lay, some time or other, violent
hands

hands on her, in order to make her the victim, both of *his* violence, and of *her* horror against him. The application is obvious.

Very happily for us, this *horror* does likewise not exist, and is no more than what, soon after, Mr. Hume himself condescends to call it, *an aversion*: for there is no nation under the sun, of which a great number of its individuals, and sometimes their collective bodies, do not only conquer this (so artfully) supposed horror, but boldly encounter, and even sometimes covet death, either in the pursuit, or in the despair of happiness. Examples of this kind are too numerous, to leave this
assertion

assertion in want of any other proof.

Why such an eminent scholar as the late Mr. Hume, could lower himself so much as to make horror and aversion original passions, and their denominations synonymous terms, can easily be conceived. His sophistry required it.

The truth is, that they are both, in common with all their brethren, derivative passions, which draw their origin from that truly, and only original one, our love of happiness. But aversion and horror differ very much in strength, and are therefore distinguished by different names.

D

Our

Our reason can over-power the one ; but not the other. We have an aversion for many things, which we either voluntarily submit to, or reluctantly undergo, to obtain some good, or to avoid some evil : such, for example, among the lesser ones, as *sea-sickness*, or *the drawing of a tooth* ; and among those that require a greater fortitude of mind, *the torture*, to avoid an ignominious death, or the guilt and shame of betraying confederates ; and, *death* itself, from different motives, as I have already shewn. Instead of which, horror overpowers our reason to a superlative degree. A person who only abhors a toad, or even a spider, would stand a very bad chance
of

of his life, or his senses, if a number of those animals were forcibly applied to his bosom, and his eyes kept fixed upon them. And what would become of a weak and delicate woman, who faints away at the mere effluvia of a cat, which she does not see, if this animal was thrown into, and tied to her lap? The answer is obvious; she would rave, or faint away.

In short, death can be dreaded, and reluctantly submitted to, but not abhorred, except by those unhappy persons who believe the mortality of the soul, and, consequently, their annihilation; or, by those, who believing its immortality, dread the consequences of its future existence; or

are so fondly attached to their imperfect, fluctuating, and perishing state of happiness in this life, that they cannot find, nor promote within themselves, any relish for a perfect, steady, and permanent happiness in a future one.

As to Mr. Hume's remark, *that all doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions*, it is full as applicable to the false doctrine of the soul's mortality, as to the true one of its immortality. Our dread of being unhappy in a future state of existence, can favour the one, full as much as our hope of the reverse can favour the other. The one can arise
from

from a bad, and the other from a good conscience.

As to the advantage in *any* controversy (as Mr. Hume says) of defending the negative, it can only take place where the affirmative is deficient in proof; which is not the case in *this* controversy. I have already shewn, and will still further shew, that the doctrine of the soul's immortality, is proved on Mr. Hume's own ground, from this axiom in natural philosophy, *That Nature does nothing in vain*: an axiom on which natural philosophy itself is established, since, without admitting and adhering to it, all reasoning on the process of nature, would be idle and nefarious;

ous; and which axiom therefore, Mr. Hume himself has been forced to adopt, in spite of his scepticism; without perceiving (at least not avowedly) that this very scepticism, this nefarious doctrine, this darling of his, which has induced, and seduced him to call in question the sacred doctrine of the soul's immortality, is totally destroyed by it. But, supposing for a moment, as fallaciously and as falsely as Mr. Hume has done, that this doctrine was destitute of such a proof, the advantage of defending the negative in this controversy, would be then as great in denying the mortality, as in denying the immortality of the soul: for, (to retort on Mr. Hume, his own manner of arguing, where

where he confounds the soul's future *state* of existence, with the existence itself) by what arguments or analogies could we then prove the mortality, any more than the immortality of a being, which no one ever saw, and no way resembles any that ever was seen?—Who would, in that case, repose such a trust in any pretended philosophy, as to admit, upon its bare testimony, the mortality, or immortality of such a being? Some new species of logic would be required for this purpose; and some new faculties of the mind, to comprehend such logic.

Nothing less, I hope, will be required, to destroy the force of the following

following arguments, with which I shall conclude and corroborate my preceding ones.

Since all systematical philosophers, and even such sceptical ones as the late Mr. Hume, are forced to adopt this axiom in natural philosophy, *That Nature does nothing in vain*, I shall proceed to prove on this very ground, as the only one on which we can reason coherently on the process of nature, That the dictates of reason, of natural philosophy, and of natural religion, concur in establishing the doctrine of our soul's immortality.

REASON

REASON alone, if properly exerted, without the assistance of any scholastic philosophy, teaches us,

That since Nature does nothing in vain, she would not have given us an unbounded love of happiness, together with ideas of all kinds and degrees of happiness, if such kinds and degrees of happiness did not exist.

That amongst these ideas of happiness, we have one of a perfect and permanent happiness, together with an adequate love of it; of which we shall be easily convinced, if we only consider, that we always strive to perfectionate and perpetuate, as much

E

and

and as far as we can, those imperfect and transitory situations in which we think and feel ourselves happy ; and consequently, that if it were in our power, we would convert the state of happiness we then enjoy, into a perfect and permanent one ; which proves, that (whether we consider it or not) we have an idea, and a love adequate to this idea, of a perfect and permanent happiness ; and that, since Nature does nothing in vain, this most valuable kind and degree of happiness must also exist.

That all kinds and degrees of happiness, which we have any idea of, are obtainable (whether pursued or not) in our present state of existence,

except

except this perfect and permanent happiness.

That since Nature does nothing in vain, this perfect and permanent happiness must also be obtainable, whether pursued or not.

That since it is not obtainable in our present state of existence, Nature must have prepared us a future one : and that to pass from our present to that future state of existence, we must be immortal ; otherwise Nature would have done something in vain, which it is evident, from the common experienced course of nature, to be impossible.

That therefore, since our body is mortal, our soul, which at present animates our body, must be essentially ourself, and immortal.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY, which is reason improved by knowledge, teaches us,

That since Nature does nothing in vain, she does not give us passions without suitable objects, no more than eyes without visible ones.

That we have two sorts of passions; instinctive ones, which are similar to those which we discover in the brutes; and mental ones, which are inherent in our soul, and only discoverable in our own species.

That

That amongst these mental passions, we have an original one, which is an unbounded love of happiness; from which all our other mental passions derive, such as a love of truth, of knowledge, &c. and which, together with our mental faculties, characterizes our soul, and distinguishes it from that which animates the brutes.

That from thence we acquire ideas of all kinds and degrees of happiness; which kinds and degrees of happiness are the objects of our love of happiness; and which, therefore, from Nature's doing nothing in vain, must necessarily exist, and be obtainable.

That

That amongst these objects, a perfect and permanent happiness is the most desirable one.

That all these objects are attainable (whether pursued or not) in our present state of existence; except this most desirable one, a perfect and permanent happiness.

That since Nature does nothing in vain, this most desirable object of our love of happiness must also be obtainable, whether pursued or not.

That, since it is not obtainable in our present state of existence, and that our body is mortal; Nature, to
have

have done nothing in vain, must have made our soul immortal.

This proof, though of itself sufficient, is still corroborated by the following one :

That it is our soul, in which this mental passion of an unbounded love of happiness originates, and is inherent, together with a mental faculty of forming ideas of all kinds and degrees of happiness, and consequently of a perfect and permanent happiness; and of thereby acquiring an adequate love, together with a sense of the want, and of the value of it; and that therefore our soul, since Nature does nothing in vain, must

must necessarily continue to exist, when the organized matter which it animates in its present state of existence, is worn out and separated from it by a natural, or torn from it by a premature or accidental dissolution.

NATURAL RELIGION, which arises from natural philosophy, discovers the existence of God, in the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness which are displayed in the formation and preservation of the universe; and therefore attributes, very justly, Nature's doing nothing in vain, to the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, as being the author of it.

On

On this improved ground, it teaches us,

That God, who from his infinite wisdom and goodness, does nothing in vain, has not given us an unbounded love of happiness, together with the power of forming ideas of all kinds and degrees of happiness, and consequently of a perfect and permanent happiness, without having given us the power of pursuing, and the means of obtaining such happiness.

That this power implies a free-agency, since no power can be exerted without it.

That God has given this power and free-agency to our soul, since it is

F

this

this spiritual being within us, which is possessed of faculties and passions which are inherent in it; and which not only distinguish it from that soul which animates the brutes, but enable it to govern those instinctive faculties and passions which we have in common with them.

That it is our soul's exertion of this power over our instinctive faculties and passions, in making them subservient to its own, which constitutes *virtue*; and that our soul's indulging the former to such a degree as to make its own subservient to them, constitutes *vice*.

That

That all kinds and degrees of happiness, are the result and reward of virtue; and all kinds and degrees of misery, the result and punishment of vice.

That, consequently, our soul's constant practice of virtue, must terminate in all kinds and degrees of happiness, and ultimately, in a perfect and permanent happiness; and that its constant indulgence of vice, must terminate in all kinds and degrees of misery, and ultimately, in a perfect and permanent misery.

That since God, in his infinite wisdom, does nothing in vain; and that this ultimate termination of our

soul's good or bad use of the power he has given it, does not take place in its present state of existence; it implies the necessity of its continuing to exist, when the matter it animates is separated from it, which proves its immortality.

I shall now draw, from the whole of what I hope to have stated coherently and convincingly, a conclusive inference. But, I must first beg leave to expose the incongruity and malignity of that insidious one, which Mr. Hume has drawn from his sceptical sophistry. He infers from the whole of it, That we have infinite obligations to Divine Revelation, for revealing to us the immortality

mortality of our soul ; which he pretends *only* to have shewn, that no other medium could ascertain.

I wish, for his sake, that he may himself have felt those infinite obligations which we have to Divine Revelation ; and that his delusive scepticism may have induced him to express them erroneously, and not sneeringly, nor, consequently, blasphemously. Of *this*, however, he gives reason to be suspected, when we consider, that according to his conclusive inference, we should be infinitely obliged to Divine Revelation for telling us a lye, since the whole of his performance, from whence he draws this inference,

tends

tends to prove (thanks to God! very fallaciously) by moral, as well as physical and metaphysical arguments, that not only Nature, but God himself, as the author of Nature, has made our soul full as mortal as our body, by having connected them together in such a manner, that the one must perish with the other.

I shall leave it to my readers, to judge of the sincerity and coherency of such an inference; and I flatter myself, that they will do justice to the decisive coherency and energy of my own; which is,

That the dictates of Reason, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion,
 establish

establish the doctrine of our soul's immortality, independently of, though consistently with, the dictates of Divine Revelation ; and, consequently,

That it is not true, what Mr. Hume asserts, " That no other medium than Divine Revelation could ascertain this great and important truth : " nor,

That Divine Revelation requires from us, for our conviction of this great and important truth, an implicit faith, at the expence of our understanding.

AFTER

AFTER having thus completed my little Essay on the Immortality of the Soul, I must now beg leave to observe,

That we have certainly those infinite obligations to Divine Revelation, which Mr. Hume, in spite of his real or pretended acknowledgment, has endeavoured, either wickedly or unwisely, to annihilate ; and which obligations, to the best of my conception, are,

First, For having illustrated and corroborated all such truths as we were already enabled to ascertain ourselves,

selves, or to be convinced of by others, by the means of those mental faculties, which God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, had originally endowed us with.

Secondly,—For those sacred Records, whereby we are informed of the source of that hereditary corruption of our nature, which militates so forcibly against that power and free-agency, by the exertion of which, God had originally enabled our first Parent to make himself and his progeny perfectly and permanently happy.

Thirdly,—For that infinite comfort, which we receive from our faith

in the Gospel, through the knowledge we acquire by it, of those means, whereby God, in his infinite mercy, has redeemed us from the misery which our inheritance of that corruption had entailed on us. And,

Finally, for teaching us the means we are ourselves to employ, to receive the benefits of this Redemption, in our present and future state of existence,

To prove what sort of faith is the free gift of God, or what sort of human faith Divine Revelation requires from us in general ; or in particular, with respect to the origin and the future *state* of our soul's existence, is
one

one of the duties of all those who are called to expound those sacred records, whereby Divine Revelation has been conveyed to us: a task, of which I do not doubt but many of them do still acquit themselves occasionally; and of which, an infinite number of their predecessors, from the time of our Saviour's suffering to the present one inclusively, have acquitted themselves with the greatest success, to the blessed satisfaction and edification of all persons open to conviction.

The task I undertook in this little Essay, was no more than to expose the fallacy and malignity of Mr. Hume's scepticism; and to prove on

his own ground, in the shortest and plainest manner, not the soul's future *state* of existence, (into which he had so sophistically metamorphosed the question) but barely the soul's future existence; which is, in other words, its IMMORTALITY.

Of this task, I have acquitted myself to the best of my small abilities. If my arguments carry conviction, and that, nevertheless, they should be attacked, derided, or cavilled at, by such ingenious sceptical authors as the late Mr. Hume; or other writing geniuses of an inferior and worse stamp; I must hope, that much abler pens than mine, will not disdain,

nor

nor fail to defend and support them, by more corroborating, and illustrating arguments of their own ; or by exposing the fallacy of every one of those of Mr. Hume, of which the few last have *alone* furnished me the means to prove his conclusive inference to be a false one, without *a minute discussion of the whole of his fallacious and malignant performance*: a task, which my avocations, and situation in life ; the narrowness of my circumstances ; and consequential want of literary assistance, do not permit me to undertake.

T H E E N D.

nor fail to defend and support them
by more corroborating, and illu-
minating arguments of their own; or
by exposing the fallacy of every one
of those of Mr. Hume, of which the
few I have here furnished me the
means to prove his conclusive in-
ference to be a false one, without a
minute dissection of the whole of his
reasonings and many other performances;
a task, which my associations, and
situation in life; the narrowness of
my circumstances; and consequent
want of literary assistance, do
not permit me to undertake.